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Assumption of Risk and the Landowner
Page Keeton*
As Leon Green states in his introductory article to this sym-
posium, a claimant may be regarded as assuming the risk of all
accidents for which the law affords him no recovery. This would
even include accidents caused in part by the claimant's contribu-
tory negligence, and accidents that are regarded as being too
remotely related to defendant's conduct to justify holding the
latter responsible therefor. But using Green's terminology
again, the discussion here is primarily related to the "assump-
tion of risk doctrine as a residuary doctrine," a doctrine that is
used to deny an injured party a recovery solely because he volun-
tarily exposed himself to dangerous conduct or a dangerous con-
dition with actual or constructive knowledge and appreciation
of such danger. Moreover, the observations made herewith will
be limited to the situation where plaintiff at the time he exposed
himself to a condition or an activity on land is found to have
actually appreciated the danger and the extent thereof of which
the defendant-occupier was or should have been aware at the
time of his negligent conduct. The practical difficulty encoun-
tered in the administration of a rule that would deny recovery
in such a case without recognizing at the same time a like rule
when plaintiff did not but should have discovered the condition
and appreciated the danger has been commented on elsewhere.'
Finally, the issue as to whether assumed risk of some kind
should be a defense when liability is imposed on defendant
without respect to legal fault, as where he is harboring vicious
animals, has not been considered. The notion is that by volun-
tarily electing to proceed, the injured party manifested his will-
ingness to accept it. But the expression that "he manifested
his willingness to accept it" is ambiguous and clouds the issue.
Actually, the injured party often only elects to take a chance,
and that is all; and the issue is whether the law requires him to
*Dean and Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1. Page Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions,
100 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 642 (1952) ; PROSSER, TORTS 642 (1941). Typical of
cases involving this problem are the following: Anderson v. Sears Roebuck Co.,
223 Minn. 1, 26 N.W.2d 355 (1947) (floor level at different heights and not
noticed. Held for defendant on ground that plaintiff should have reasonably been
expected to discover them); Kingsul Theatres v. Quillen, 29 Tenn. App. 248,
196 S.W.2d 316 (1946) (plaintiff allowed to recover when she fell at entrance
of theatre while looking back for daughter and granddaughter).
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"accept it" in the sense that losses from any harm suffered
cannot be shifted to the defendant. The issue as to whether
an actor's election to take a chance should bar recovery is far
more fundamental and important than the procedural issue as
to whether, if it is a basis for denial of recovery, the facts
must be pleaded and proved as an affirmative defense or whether
the negative must be proved by the claimant to establish a
breach of duty, or a prima facie case. Most of the land cases
seem to adopt the latter as the proper approach, and as Green
states, assumption of risk is therefore but the negative of duty.
It is submitted that any general principle to the effect that
one who elects to take a chance in exposing himself to dangerous
conditions or activities on land should be required to "accept"
the risk of injury is unsound and must have many qualifications.
Salmond asserted that the maxim volenti non fit injuria covers
three distinct types of cases: "(a) those in which the plaintiff
has agreed expressly or impliedly to suffer harm or to run the
risk of it; (b) those in which because the plaintiff knows of
the danger, the defendant has done no wrong in causing it; and
(c) those in which because the plaintiff knows of the danger,
his act in voluntarily exposing himself to it is an act of con-
tributory negligence, and so deprives him of an action."'2 No
one would deny that plaintiff's election to expose himself to
a danger on land was relevant to the issues of whether defend-
ant has exercised ordinary care or whether plaintiff's conduct
was unreasonably dangerous to himself, but many other factors
are relevant on these fault issues, including the justification
that each might have under the particular circumstances for
taking a chance. Moreover, the justification or lack of justifica-
tion that the defendant might have for maintaining a dangerous
condition on his land is not at all conclusive or the same as it
would be for the plaintiff in electing to expose himself to such
danger. The statement often made that if it were negligence
for the defendant to maintain a particular condition the danger
of which was obvious, there would appear to be no escape from
the conclusion that it was negligence for the plaintiff to en-
counter it is clearly erroneous and absurd.A Thus, the reasons
2. SALMOND, TORTS 43 (8th ed. 1934).
3. See Fitzgerald v. Connecticut River Paper Co., 155 Mass. 155, 29 N.E. 464,
31 Am. St. Rep. 537 (1891) (master-servant relation) ; Mantino v. Sutter Hos-
pital Assoc., 211 Cal. 556, 296 Pac. 76 (1931) (nurse employed by patient slipped
on the floor of a room in which the patient was confined). In the Fitzgerald case,
the court said: "Certainly, it would 'be inconsistent to hold that a defendant's
act is negligent in reference to the danger of injuring the plaintiff, and that
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that actuate the proprietor of a shop for using a terrazzo floor,
for constructing a raised platform in front of a soda fountain,
for using wax to clean floors, or for constructing a stairway
without a hand-rail are altogether different from the reasons
that impel a business guest to make use of the defendant's
premises under the particular circumstances. 4
EXPRESS ASSUMPTION OF RISK
But this residuary doctrine of assumed risk purports to be
a limitation on liability because of a vague sort of consent.5 It is
said to be an independent reason for denying recovery to a
claimant even though the trier of fact can justifiably conclude
that (a) defendant created an unreasonable risk of harm and
(b) plaintiff exposed himself to it unreasonably. It refers to
Salmond's first category, the type of case in which, according
to Salmond, plaintiff has agreed expressly or impliedly to suffer
harm or run the risk of it. If this residuary doctrine under this
category were limited to the type of case in which plaintiff
had made a promise in fact, expressly or impliedly, to bear all
losses resulting from any harm that he might suffer by exposing
himself to a danger created by defendant's negligent conduct,
there would not be much reason to quarrel with the notion. If
a landowner permits a person to come on his premises in re-
liance on a promise by the latter that he will not hold the land-
owner responsible for any injury suffered from exposure to a
known danger, then the promise or assurance by the licensee
or invitee would normally be enforceable and binding, whether
or not the understanding is to be regarded as a bargain. The
landowner having consented to the intrusion in reliance on the
assurance that he would not be held responsible for any harm
suffered should be able to enforce the promise made to him.
plaintiff is not negligent in voluntarily exposing himself when he understands
the danger." Such is a clearly unsound proposition.
4. Page Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 20 TEx. L. REV. 562
(1942) ; Page Keeton, Personal Injury Resulting from Open and Obvious Condi-
tions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 629, 631 (1952).
5. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 HARV. L. REV. 14 (1906)
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 893 (1939). Lindquest v. S. S. Kresge Co., 345 Mo.
849, 136 S.W.2d 303 (1940) (plaintiff fell down stairs made of marble and
worn to depth of three-eighths inch by constant use. She had used stairs before.
Held, defendant not liable since true ground of liability must be proprietor's
superior knowledge) ; Ambrose v. Moffat Coal Co., 358 Pa. 465, 58 A.2d 20
(1948) ; Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 S.W.2d 369 (1936) (postman injured
while delivering mail by falling on runway covered by melting snow and ice);
Funari v. Gravem-Inglis Baking Co., 40 Cal.App.2d 25, 104 P.2d 44 (1940)
(slippery condition on elevator floor. Plaintiff injured while delivering sugar).
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The question in such a case is "To what extent will such a
promise or contract be enforced?" or "To what extent is such
a contract to be considered illegal in that the defendant is
attempting to contract away his responsibilities for injuries
arising out of his negligent conduct?" If the promise is one
that the promisor should be regarded as free to make under
the circumstances, then either the defendant's negligence is not
a breach of duty to the promisor even though it may be to
others or the contract should be regarded as a defense to liability
just as a release given after an accident would be a defense.
When the promise is made as a part of a bargain, then the
denial of recovery follows from the general doctrine set forth
in the Restatement of Contracts making contracts exempting
one of the parties from liability for negligence legal.6 As a
matter of fact this doctrine is much broader than necessary to
include the cases considered herein since the doctrine which
confers on a person the power to give up a right of recovery
which he would otherwise have in return for the permission to
use a landowner's property would apply not only to injuries
resulting from dangers in existence when the promise was made,
but also to injuries arising out of negligent acts after the per-
mission was granted.
When, therefore, one is privileged to exclude visitors, his
agreement to admit them on condition that there shall be no
liability for injury would probably be upheld in most instances.7
When the property owner is not so privileged, however, this
would not seem to be true. If the defendant is engaged in the
kind of business which makes it obligatory for him to serve
all who apply, the defendant cannot justify the exoneration
6. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 574, 575 (1932). Under these sections a bar-
gain for exemption from liability for the consequences of ordinary negligence is
not illegal except when (a) the parties are employer and employee and the
bargain relates to negligent injury of the employee in the course of employment,
or (b) one of the parties is charged with a duty of public service, and the bargain
relates to negligence in the performance of any part of its duty to the public,
for which it has received or been promised compensation.
7. Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Adv. Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 180 N.E. 245,
84 A.L.R. 645 (1932) (provision in a contract exempting a landlord from liability
to a lessee for property damage resulting from his negligence held enforceable) ;
Globe Home Impr. Co. v. Perth Amboy C. of C. Credit Rating Bureau, 116
N.J.L. 168, 182 Atl. 641, 102 A.L.R. 1068 (1936) (provision in a contract
exempting credit company for false information); Checkley v. Illinois Central
R.R., 257 Ill. 491, 100 N.E. 942, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1127 (1913); Frederick v.
Great Northern Ry., 207 Wis. 234, 240 N.W. 387, 241 N.W. 363, 80 A.L.R. 984
(1932).
8. Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Adv. Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 180 N.E. 245, 84
A.L.R. 645 (1932) ; See McClain, Contractual Limitation of Liability for Neg-
ligence, 28 HARv. L. REv. 550 (1915).
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contract on the ground that he could have refused his service
altogether. The suggestion has been made that courts have
refused to uphold such agreements when one party is at such
obvious disadvantage in bargaining power that the effect of
the contract is to put him at the mercy of the other's negligence.
Even though the defendant is privileged to withhold consent,
if he is offering a unique service, or operates an amusement
center, or has a monopoly, such a contract might well be re-
garded as unenforceable. 10 No attempt is here made to give this
question a thorough treatment.
IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF RISK
An implied in fact promise to assume a risk is of course just
as effective to bar a recovery as an express promise. It is sub-
mitted that such an implied in fact promise can be regarded as
having been made in the many situations where a plaintiff was
employed to correct a dangerous condition negligently created
by the defendant." Thus, in De La Pena v. Moore-McCormick
Lines, Inc.,2 plaintiff was an employee of an independent con-
tractor who was employed to clean up the defendant's ship. He
slipped on a pile of metal strips lying on the deck and fell back
into a trench that surrounded the hatch. The court held that
he could not recover because he was employed to clean up the
strips along with everything else loose on the deck, and the
trench was open and obvious. Such an implied in fact promise
to assume the risk could normally be found when one is em-
ployed to inspect for and repair concealed dangers as well as
when the employment is to repair an obvious danger. In all
such instances, it can normally be inferred that it was the in-
tention of the parties for the repairman to accept without re-
course the risk involved and the charge made by the plaintiff
9. PROSSEB, TORTS § 55 (2d ed. 1955); HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS § 21.6
(1956).
10. Often, there is a stipulation against liability when a patron pays an admis-
sion fee into a place of public amusement. Frequently, stipulations of this char-
acter have not been enforced, because it was not brought to the attention of the
patron. Kushner v. McGinnis, 289 Mass. 326, 194 N.E. 106, 97 A.L.R. 578
(1935) ; Brennan v. Ocean View Amusement Co., 289 Mass. 587, 194 N.E. 911
(1935). It is doubtful if the Massachusetts court would have enforced it, even if
the plaintiff's attention had been called to the exemption provision.
11. Broecker v. Armstrong Cork Co., 128 N.J.L. 3, 24 A.2d 194 (1942) (injury
was caused by the very condition which the plaintiff was employed to correct
and was in the process of correcting when injured) ; Byars v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., 155 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Brucker v. Matsen, 18 Wash. 2d 375,
139 P.2d 276 (1943).
12. 84 F. Supp. 698 (1948).
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for the service to be performed reflects the risk that is being
incurred. If, for example, an expert is employed for a large
fee to put out an oil well fire negligently started by a producer,
it would be universally recognized that the expert agrees, im-
pliedly if not expressly, to accept such a risk, without recourse.
While the doctrine set forth in the Restatement of Contracts
as to the enforceability of promises relieving another of respon-
sibility for negligence is by its terms applicable to bargaining
transactions only, it would seem, as indicated earlier, that in
any case where the plaintiff in advance of encountering a danger
indicates to defendant, by the nature of the circumstances, that
he does not intend to hold the defendant responsible, and de-
fendant thereafter grants permission to him to encounter the
danger, such declared intention would be given effect.18 Thus,
in Walsh v. West Coast Coal Mines,'4 the mine inspector who
volunteered his assistance to defendant's inexperienced foreman
to prevent an imminent cave-in was held to have assumed the
risk of the cave-in that killed him.
If this residuary doctrine of assumed risk related only to
the question of the enforceability of promises, expressly or im-
pliedly made, to accept a risk without recourse there would be
little room to argue about it. However, it is commonly used as
a basis for denying a recovery to the invitee or business guest
who encounters known dangers on the property of the invitor
or landowner. Thus it is said in the Restatement of Torts that
"The second type of situation in which assumption of risk
constitutes a defense is where the plaintiff enters the land or
uses the chattels of the defendant or otherwise associates him-
self with the defendant's actions, having no right or privilege
to do so, save that derived from the defendant's consent. In a
situation of this sort the defendant has no greater duty than
to inform the plaintiff of the danger of which the defendant
knows or should be aware; if the plaintiff discovers the exist-
13. PROssaR, TORTS 305, § 55 (2d ed. 1955). Thus one who rides on a train,
or enters a place of amusement on a pass stipulating that the donor is not to be
held liable for negligence would not be able to recover.
14. 31 Wash. 2d 396, 197 P.2d 233 (1948). The situation in this case is
clearly distinguishable from those where a rescuer has been allowed recovery. In
the latter, there is no basis for an implied-in-fact promise made by the rescuer to
the defendant, since the latter was not in a position to deny to the rescuer the
privilege of encountering the danger to save the life or property of a third person.
The court in the Walsh case gave unsatisfactory reasons for distinguishing the
rescue cases. The court reasoned that because plaintiff was not acting impulsively
and because plaintiff was not acting to save or assist an injured person, the
plaintiff should 'be denied recovery.
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ence of such danger, a breach of duty by the defendant in failing
to notify the plaintiff of it does not cause him to be liable.' 1 5
There is a growing and respectable body of authority that would
deny to a landowner such a broad defense. Thus, a government
meat inspector was allowed to recover for an injury incurred
in stepping from a platform to the main floor which was wet
and slippery from the daily operations of the defendant 6 and
a general contractor was held liable for injuries incurred by
a subcontractor's employee who fell because of a defective porch
railing while painting. 17 The actual result reached in many cases
is inconsistent with the notion either that the occupier's duty
is any way limited other than by the requirement of negligence
or that there is such a defense as assumption of risk or volenti
non fit injuria which is distinct from contributory negligence.18
Often in those instances there is no discussion either of assump-
tion of risk or of the necessity for a breach of duty, the court
being content to say that there was evidence sufficient to jus-
tify the findings of the jury on the issues of negligence and
contributory negligence. 9 Those results can be taken as some
indication of dissatisfaction with the idea that a non-negligent
customer should be denied relief simply because he chose to en-
counter a known danger caused by the occupier's negligent con-
duct. It is safe to say that in many such instances the defense
argued the absence of any duty but the judge who wrote the
opinion chose to ignore a discussion of the problem. Occasionally
a court will do as the New Hampshire Supreme Court has done
and will in clear language reject any notion that the defendant's
duty of protection is in any way limited other than by the re-
15. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 893, comment b (1939).
16. Swift & Co. v. Schuster, 192 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1951).
17. Butler v. King, 106 A.2d 385 (N.H. 1954).
18. Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Ohio St. 31, 37, 90 N.E.2d 859, 862
(1950) (The court said, ". . . since the jury held that this particular plaintiff,
. . . was not guilty of contributory negligence it is difficult to perceive how, under
any correct charge, it could have found that such plaintiff assumed the risk") ;
Caron v. Grays Harbor County, 18 Wash. 2d 397, 139 P.2d 626, 148 A.L.R. 626
(1943); Dickinson v. Rockford Van Orman Hotel Co., 326 Ill. App. 686, 63
N.E.2d 257 (1945) (hotel).
19. Ventromile v. Malden Electric Co., 317 Mass. 132, 57 N.E.2d 209 (1944)
(plaintiff fell on a recently waxed floor; court seems to assume liability follows
if defendant was negligent) ; Walgreen-Texas Co. v. Shivers, 137 Tex. 493, 154
S.W.2d 625 (1941) (plaintiff recovered for injuries received from fall in getting
down from raised platform) ; Blanks v. Southland Hotel, 229 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.
Sup. Ct. 1950) (plaintiff fell on stairs which he had used many times before and
recovery allowed) ; Wood v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 237 Iowa 799, 23 N.W.2d
843 (1946) (plaintiff tripped on floor mat in lobby theatre. Court reversed trial
court judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto, on the ground that negli-
gence of the defendant was a jury question).
[Vol. XXII
1961] THE LANDOWNER
quirement of negligence or fault.2 ° Occasionally, also, a court will
say that, save in the master and servant cases, assumption of
risk is but a phase of contributory negligence ;21 and others ar-
rive at substantially the same result in a more confusing man-
ner. Thus, in one case where a female customer in a grocery
store slipped on an oiled floor, the court said that she had a right
as an invitee to walk on the floor while making her purchase,
that the floor was the only means provided by the proprietor for
the purpose, and that "the danger of falling was not such an
obvious one that an ordinarily prudent person exercising ordi-
nary care for his own safety would not have walked on it." This
simply means that as long as the plaintiff is acting reasonably,
i.e., non-negligently, recovery will not be denied. 22
An English judge, Scrutton, L.J., once suggested that when
an invitee or business visitor paid for the privilege of entering
land, the defendant should have the premises reasonably safe;
but that when the business visitor does not pay for his entry,
then a warning would be sufficient. 23 The trend seems to be in
the direction of holding the occupier of an amusement or enter-
tainment center liable for his negligence to a non-negligent
patron, notwithstanding the latter's appreciation of the danger. 24
20. Williamson v. Derry Electric Co., 89 N.H. 216, 196 Atl. 265 (1938)
(Fact situation similar to the one assumed at the beginning of this article. Court
said, "The invitation to enter a dangerous place was extended, and the responsi-
bility for the damage was not, as a matter of law, discharged by the plaintiff's
notice and appreciation of it.").
21. Peyla v. Duluth M. & I. Range R. Co., 218 Minn. 196, 15 N.W.2d 518,
154 A.L.R. 505 (1944) ; Rutherford v. James, 33 N.M. 440, 270 Pac. 794, 63
A.L.R. 237 (1928) (landlord and tenant relationship with landlord under obliga-
tion to keep in repair).
22. Kroger Groc. & Baking Co. v. Monroe, 237 Ky. 60, 34 S.W.2d 929 (1931).
23. See Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, [1933] 1 K.B. 205, 213; Purkis
v. Walthamstow B.C., 151 L.T. 30, 32 (1934) ; and Liddle v. Yorkshire County
Council, [1934] 2 K.B. 101, 109. An excellent and thoughtful discussion of the
English cases may be found in WINFIELD, TORT 562-568 (1948). No case has yet
been reported in England according to Winfield in which the decision turned
upon whether or not occupier must make his premises reasonably safe or merely
give adequate warning of their existence. In Letang v. Ottawa Electric Ry.,
[1926] A.C. 725, the plaintiff was an invitee on the defendant's premises where
there were some stairs coated with ice, of which she was given no warning and
which they made no attempt to remove. She did her best to avoid slipping by
holding on to a rail, but in spite of this she slipped and was injured. The de-
fendants were held liable, for, it was said, even if the plaintiff saw the danger
of slipping, she neither realized the extent of the risk nor did she freely and
voluntarily encounter it. Mere knowledge of a risk is no more consent to it in
this connection than in any other part of the law of tort.
24. Correira v. Atlantic Amusement Co., 302 Mass. 81, 18 N.E.2d 435 (1939)
(slipping on steps at theatre) ; Olds v. St. Louis National Baseball Club, 232
Mo. App. 897, 104 S.W.2d 746 (1937) (exit at baseball park not screened);
Potts v. Crafts, 5 Cal. App. 2d 83, 42 P.2d 87 (1935) (amusement device; oval
board track defective), 16 TEX. L. REV. 118 (1937) ; McGillivray v. Eramian,
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The proprietor of a baseball park who screens in a sufficient
space to take care of the normal demand for seats, with that
protection and at a price stipulated, is not liable to one who is
injured in an unscreened part of the park.2 5 Liability of the
proprietor to those who selected the unscreened portion under
such circumstances would be difficult to justify. His conduct
is not commonly regarded as unethical. If, however, the patron
is forced to a choice of seeing the game in an unscreened place
or not at all, there is authority supporting liability when negli-
gence has been found by the jury. For example, failure to
screen the exit to the screened portion of the stands has resulted
in liability.26 A person operating an amusement center is in a
line of business that is likely to attract people in large numbers.
Sometimes he is making a profit by catering to a desire on the
part of people to get a thrill; and often he either has a monopoly
or his service is unique and there is no adequate substitute for it.
Notwithstanding these evidences of dissatisfaction with a
doctrine that would deny recovery to a business guest on no
other basis than that he appreciated the danger of a condition
that he elected to encounter, it must be admitted that there is
abundant authority for the proposition that the true ground
upon which the occupier's liability for personal injuries arising
from dangerous conditions on land rests is his superior knowl-
edge of the dangers thereon. 27 However, the dissatisfaction
reported herein with the view that would deny recovery to a
business guest simply because he was fully aware of a danger
encountered is sufficient to justify a critical inquiry as to the
reason therefor. Often, it is said without further elaboration
309 Mass. 430, 35 N.E.2d 209 (1941) (bowling alley floor back of the foul line
was uneven and rotten).
25. Keys v. Alamo City Baseball Co., 150 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941)
Lorino v. New Orleans Baseball and Amusement Co., 16 La. App. 95, 133 So. 408
(1931) ; Brisson v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n, 185 Minn. 507, 240
N.W. 903 (1932).
26. Olds v. St. Louis National Baseball Club, 232 Mo. App. 897, 104 S.W.2d
746 (1937).
27. Page Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Condi-
tion8, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 629, 634 (1952). Lindquist v. S. S. Kresge Co.,
345 Mo. 849, 136 S.W.2d 303 (1940) (Plaintiff fell down stairs made of marble
and worn to depth of three-eighths inch by constant use. She had used stairs
before. Held, defendant not liable since true ground of liability must be pro-
prietor's superior knowledge) ; Ambrose v. Moffat Coal Co., 358 Pa. 465, 58
A.2d 20 (1948) ; Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo. 274, 96 S.W.2d 369 (1936) (postman
injured while delivering mail by falling on runway covered by melting snow and
ice) ; Funari v. Gravem-Inglis Baking Co., 40 Cal. App. 2d 25, 104 P.2d 44
(1940) (Slippery condition on elevator floor. Plaintiff injured while delivering
sugar).
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that in such a case a person, by voluntarily electing to proceed,
manifests his willingness to accept it. It is said that by entering
freely and voluntarily into any relation or situation which pre-
sents obvious danger, the plaintiff may be taken to accept it,
and to agree that he will look out for himself, and relieve the
defendant of responsibility. 28 This is commonly referred to as
implied assumption of risk. But in most of the cases it cannot
be said that there is any implied in fact promise made by plain-
tiff to the defendant that the latter is to be relieved of all
responsibility. The so-called promise is fictional and the effect
is simply to require by law acceptance of the risk because plain-
tiff elected to take a chance. 29 If a business guest is to be denied
relief, it should be done not by means of a fictional promise but
on the basis of policy clearly stated and explained. For example:
B, a business guest, enters on premises of 0, occupier and owner
of a grocery store. The floor is slippery, and B slips, falls, and
breaks his arm. It certainly would require a stretch of the
imagination to infer from such a situation that defendant in-
tended to grant permission only if plaintiff was willing to
accept all risks and that plaintiff understood this, and by going
on impliedly gave such assurance. If defendant or his employee
had been present at the entrance and advised B that he would
have to come on at his own risk, then of course an intent to
assume the risk is actually present. Or if a notice to the same
effect had been posted at the entrance, a like intent on the part
of the plaintiff is evidenced. But this is not the typical situation.
As stated at the outset, about all that can be said is that the
business guest in the typical situation, without thinking or know-
ing anything about the law relating to a right of recovery of
injured, elects or chooses to take a chance. It is often said that
the maxim volenti non fit injuria applies and that consent bars
recovery just as it does when there has been consent to conduct
committed with the intention of causing an invasion of a legally
protected interest, as in assault, battery, and false imprison-
ment. But there is a vast difference in the nature of plaintiff's
consent manifested when he elects to encounter danger from
conduct of defendant committed without an intention of in-
flicting harm from that manifested when defendant acts for
the purpose of inflicting an invasion on another, and the latter,
without coercion, manifests a desire to receive it. Quite ob-
28. PROSSEB, TORTS 307 (2d ed. 1955).
29. FLEMING, TORTS 236 (1957).
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viously the latter kind of conduct is either not generally re-
garded as socially undesirable 3° -as when one consents to an
operation-or, the plaintiff and defendant are both guilty of
blameworthy conduct and are in pari delicto- as when a
woman consents to an abortion.3 1 Again, one who knows that
an invasion of a particular kind is certain or substantially cer-
tain to result from conduct in which another is engaged cannot
normally recover if he could avoid subjecting himself to such
conduct but instead manifests a willingness to submit to it be-
cause of a public policy against recovery for a self-inflicted
invasion.32 But when liability is sought on the basis of negli-
gence, neither the defendant nor the plaintiff wants or knows
that harm will follow from the action that each party took pre-
ceding the injury. Defendant cannot be held responsible simply
because his conduct created a risk of harm of which he was
aware. The risk must be unreasonable. If the defendant is not
to be held liable for creating a danger and taking a chance of
injuring others unless the chance was unreasonable and he was
negligent, then it seems that the plaintiff should not in theory
be denied relief for taking a chance unless the chance was un-
reasonable and he was contributorily negligent.
COERCION
It is commonly said that assumption of risk must be free
and voluntary and that the risk is not assumed if the conduct
of the defendant has left the plaintiff with no reasonable al-
terriative.3 3 But according to the Restatement of Torts, and
apparently the results in many cases, the plaintiff's individual
necessities and the compulsion of circumstances will not have
the effect of causing the assumption of risk to be involuntary so
long as defendant is in a position to deny the plaintiff the right
or privilege to encounter the danger.3 4 If the defendant's tortious
conduct makes it reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to en-
counter a danger in order to exercise a right or privilege not
30. O'Brien v. Cunard Steamship Co., 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266, 13 L.R.A.
329 (1891).
31. Hudson v. Croft, 33 Cal. 2d 654, 204 P.2d 1 (1949) (illegal boxing match),
noted 63 IIAuV. L. REV. 175 (1949), 2 OKLA. L. RV. 108 (1949) ; Bowlan v.
Lunsford, 176 Okla. 115, 54 P.2d 666 (1936) (abortion). There is a conflict.
See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 60 (1934); Bohlen, Consent as Affecting Civil
Liability for Breaches of the Peace, 24 COL. L. 'REV. 819 (1924).
32. See introductory comments by Seavey to c. 3, of SEAVEY, KEETON, &
THURSTON, CASES ON TORTS (1950).
33. PROSSa, TORTS § 55, at 311 (2d ed. 1955).
34. Section 893, comment b.
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dependent on consent obtained from defendant, then the risk
has not been voluntarily accepted. Thus, one who encounters a
danger in the course of using a city sidewalk, a city street, or
a waiting room of a railroad station would not assume the risk
because his right to the use of the property is not dependent
upon the consent of the owner or proprietor. 35 This reason is
seldom given in cases of this character, and in most jurisdic-
tions it is doubtful if the courts have consciously dealt in a
different way with city streets and public utility premises from
the ordinary business establishment. 6 Often it seems to be
assumed that even in the cases of streets and highways the
plaintiff can be entirely deprived of his privilege so long as he
has a feasible alternative route.37 It would seem that in such a
case plaintiff has no alternative at all except to give up a privi-
lege to use the particular route and that even under the narrow
Restatement view of coercion the risk should be regarded as in-
voluntarily assumed. It does appear, however, that in most cases
where the plaintiff was not considered as acting in a voluntary
manner he was acting in the exercise of a privilege or right.
Examples are where he was making use of the facilities of a
public utility, where he as a tenant was using a common pas-
sageway or leased premises that the landlord was under the
obligation of keeping in repair,38 and where he was injured in
rescuing life or property.39 The fact that some recognition is
given to the notion that plaintiff's acceptance of a risk may be
involuntary when he is in the exercise of a right or privilege
35. Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q.B. 439, 116 Eng. Rep. 932 (1848) (Plaintiff
had legal right without respect to consent of defendant to get horse from stable
to street by means of only exit.).
36. Porter v. Toledo Terminal Road Co., 152 Ohio St. 463, 90 N.E.2d 142
(1950), noted 19 U. CiN. L. REv. 407 (1950) (Railroad crossing rough and out
of repair and plaintiff was injured when wheel of bicycle broke. There was an
alternative route. Court reversed judgment for plaintiff on ground that trial
court erred in refusing a charge on assumption of risk). Smith v. City of Cuya-
hoga Falls, 73 Ohio App. 22, 53 N.E.2d 670 (1943) (court said plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence but it is rather assumption of risk that court is
using because reasonableness of plaintiff's actions not considered). Recovery is
often allowed in cases of this character after concluding that plaintiff was not
guilty of contributory negligence without discussing the question as to the ap-
plicability of assumption of risk. Ahern v. Des Moines, 234 Iowa 113, 12 N.W.2d
296 (1943) ; Cato v. New Orleans, 4 So.2d 450 (La. App. 1941).
37. PROSSER, TORTS § 55, at 312 (2d ed. 1955).
38. Ahern v. Des Moines, 234 Iowa 113, 12 N.W.2d 296 (1943) (sidewalk)
Cato v. New Orleans, 4 So.2d 450 (La. App. 1941) (sidewalk) ; Rutherford v.
James, 33 N.M. 440, 270 Pac. 794, 63 A.L.R. 237 (1928) (landlord and tenant
relationship).
39. Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902 (4th Dep't 1946),
32 CORNELL L.Q. 605 (1947), 45 MicH. L. REV. 918 (1947), 25 TEX. L. REV.
688 (1947), Rushton v. Howle, 79 Ga. App. 360, 53 S.E.2d 768 (1949).
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does not touch the numerous cases where he encounters a danger
under compulsion of circumstances. It was economic coercion,
for example, that resulted in the enactment of Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts and the abolition of assumption of risk as a
defense as to the employer-employee relationship. Obviously,
there are some relationships between landowner and intruder
where the landowner's duty may well be satisfied by giving
notice of dangers as an alternative to eliminating a danger, such
as where the intruder is a trespasser or a licensee. But as has
been observed, the key to the law here lies in the relationship
between the parties, and where the plaintiff is a wrongdoer or
a donee, then the fact that plaintiff has elected to take a chance
may justifiably be a basis for denying relief.40 It has been sug-
gested in another article that it might be considered unwise
policy to subject the defendant landowner to law suits by the
ordinary business guest where injuries allegedly resulted from
open and obvious conditions because of the impracticability of
passing upon the very close questions of negligence and con-
tributory negligence that are necessarily involved, but this is
either an alternative reason or one in addition to the argument
that plaintiff elected to take a chance and should be denied
relief.41 In McKee: v. Patterson,42 discussed by Green in his
introductory article, an employee of a sub-contractor was in-
jured when a ladder he had ascended to do certain overhead
work slipped and plaintiff fell to the floor. It was found by
the jury that the general contractor had been negligent in not
providing a safe place to work for the employee of the sub-
contractor. While the majority in that case denied recovery
because of the assumed risk doctrine, a dissenting judge did
note the economic compulsion under which the plaintiff was
acting. Such a case seems to demonstrate that any general doc-
trine denying recovery to one who voluntarily elects to take a
chance is an unwarranted limitation on the landowner's duty.
CONCLUSION
In his introductory article, Leon Green states in conclusion
that the best usage for a defensive theory is the one "that most
40. HAnPER & JAMES, TORTS § 21.2 (1956): "The key to the problem lies
in the relationship between the parties, and the duty owed by defendant to plain-
tiff under all the circumstances."
41. Page Keeton, Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 68
U. PA. L. REV. 629, 641 (1952).
42. 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391 (1954).
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sharply focuses the defensive facts. Assumed risk is usually too
blunt and too comprehensive to serve such a function in a highly
developed adversary process." With that general conclusion the
writer agrees, especially as regards the landowner cases. No
doubt the defendant's duty has been and may justifiably be
limited to that of protecting trespassers, and those coming on
with permission but as an accommodation from the occupier,
from hidden dangers, but it would seem that such a limitation
applied generally to invitees and business guests is unwarranted.
The notion that plaintiff must be regarded as accepting the risk
simply because of an election to take a chance is, it is submitted,
an unsound generalization.
